Illinois Appellate Court: Violation of Contractual Post-Employment Non-Compete Does Not Extend Duration of the Restrictive Covenant

An employer’s successful lawsuit to enjoin two former highly-skilled employees from operating a competing financial services company resulted in only a one-month-long preliminary injunction — despite proof of the employees’ violation of the agreement — because the contract did not allow an extension of the term based upon the employees’ violation during the restriction period.

In Citadel Investment Group, LLC  v. Teza Technologies, LLC, the Illinois Appellate Court recently affirmed the trial judge’s entry of this short-term injunction, even though the two defendants had competed in violation of the contract and had separately violated a non-solicitation agreement during the nine-month period which began in mid-February 2009.  Under Citadel’s agreement, Citadel paid the two former employees tens of thousands of dollars during the non-compete period.  Specifically defendant Mikhail Malyshev received $30,000 per month and defendant Jace Kohlmeier received $21,000 monthly.

But the Cook County Circuit Court, after an evidentiary hearing, found that the defendants had competed as early as late March 2009 by forming a competing firm.  When Citadel learned on July 9, 2009 that the two employees already had formed what became Teza Technologies to compete in violation of their contractual obligations, Citadel moved for a preliminary injunction and the hearing was held on September 28.  The trial court entered a written ruling on October 16, 2009 granting the injunction, but held that the injunction expired on November 16.  The court specifically denied the plaintiff’s request that the injunction extend for nine months from the date of the order.

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, finding that the express terms of the contracts limited the duration of the restrictive covenant to nine months after termination of employment.  The court distinguished a prior opinion in Prairie Eye Center v. Butler, 329 Ill. App. 3d 293 (2002), which had upheld an extension of the term of the restrictive covenant because the contract in Prairie Eye expressly allowed an extension upon the finding of a breach.  Because the Citadel agreement had no contractual language permitting an extension if the former employees violated the agreement, the appellate court declined to extend the length of the non-compete.

While the ruling relates to injunctive relief only and not issues of damages, the impact of the court’s literal reading of the non-compete is obvious.  Citadel did not obtain the nine-month window of non-competition for which it had bargained and paid because the contract failed to foresee and address what should occur if the defendants breached the agreement during its term.

The lesson to an employer operating in Illinois is simple.  The contract drafter should add a sentence that provides that if the former employee is found to be in breach of the restrictive covenant, the parties agree that any injunction shall extend for the full duration of the non-compete period commencing on the date of the entry of the injunction.  Otherwise the injunction remedy may prove to offer little, if any value, in the real world.

Georgia Moves a Step Closer to Noncompete Reform

It may soon be a lot easier to enforce noncompete/nonsolicitation agreements in Georgia.  Late last week the Georgia House Judiciary Committee passed a resolution to amend the Georgia Constitution to allow the General Assembly to pass laws governing competitive activities between employee and employer, distributors and manufacturers, franchisors and franchisees and others.   The need to protect company investments in people drove the change, as did the confusing case law on the subject.   The proposed amendment would also allow the Assembly to pass laws which would permit courts to limit the duration, scope and geographic area of such contracts.  In other words, courts would be permitted to rewrite the contracts to make them reasonable.

The Judiciary Committee resolution is not yet the law.  It still needs the approval of the full House, the Senate, the Governor and the voters this fall.  According to the local press, there appears to be a lot of support for the resolution.  See Fulton County Daily Report, February 12, 2010.

In the News…

Newspaper Stands

Cases and issues making the headlines*:

More Noncompetes and Celebrities (January 25)
CBS’s radio morning personality in DC, Donnie Simpson, is reportedly leaving CBS.  According to the story in the Washington Post (here), Simpson will be prevented from joining a competitive station for 13 and ½ months as a result of a noncompete agreement with CBS. 

Fashion and the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (January 25)
Magazine publisher Conde Nast is reportedly pursuing information from third-party providers about unknown individuals who have allegedly improperly used other people’s usernames and passwords to access and obtain files from Conde Nast’s computers.  Story here.

China Prosecuting Alleged Trade Secret Theft (January 23)
Chinese police have reportedly arrested four employees of Australian company Rio Tinto Ltd on charges of, among other things, trade secret infringement.  Story here.

Cloud Computing and the CFAA – a Call to Arms (January 23)
As more people are cloud computing, Microsoft has reportedly called on the federal government to “modernize the laws” (including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) to ensure greater security.  Stories here, here, and here.

Trade Secret Settlement (January 23)
The trade secret lawsuit between semiconductor competitors, Applied Materials Inc. and Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc. (founded by former Apple employees), has reportedly been settled.  Story here (paid subscription).

MA Noncompete Bill (January 23)
The Massachusetts Bar Association will be holding a roundtable on the proposed MA Noncompete legislation.  Speakers are the bill’s sponsors, State Representative Lori Ehrlich and State Representative Will Brownsberger; lawyer and lead author/advisor on the bill, Russell Beck, and lawyer Andrea Kramer.  Information here

Conan O’Brien’s Noncompete Resolved (January 23)
Almost as quickly as it started, Conan O’Brien is reportedly leaving The Tonight Show and, as a result of a noncompete agreement, off the air until September 2010.  Of course, he did reportedly receive $45 million for the trouble – of which he is said to be giving $12 million to his staff.  Stories here, here, and here

The Muffin Man (or Woman) and Trade Secrets (January 23)
Bimbo Bakeries USA Inc. has reportedly sued a former executive who left for competitor Hostess Brands Inc.  The case was brought in Pennsylvania and seems to rely on the inevitable disclosure doctrine as the basis for a request to enjoin the former executive – who is supposedly one of the few people in the world who knows the recipe for Thomas’ English Muffins.  Story here (paid subscription).

No Heart When it Comes to Trade Secrets (January 23)
Berkeley Heartlab Inc. has reportedly filed a lawsuit alleging trade secret misappropriation (among other things) by its former employees and their new employer.  Story here (paid subscription). 

Motorola Sues Former Exec (January 23)
Motorola has reportedly sued a former executive who left to join Nokia.  The reported basis for the lawsuit is the protection of Motorola’s trade secrets.  Story here

Foley’s 5 Part Trade Secret Series (January 23)
Foley & Lardner’s Trade Secret / Noncompete Practice just completed a 5-part web conference series on trade secret protection.  The series will be available here.  Each part is a “stand alone” topic, but all 5 combine together for a comprehensive overview of trade secret / noncompete issues.  Enjoy!

*For earlier stories, go to the In the News (archives) page.

When You Draft Your Noncompete, Should You Define Your Business as “Cheesy” or “Studently and Trendy”?

A common debate in noncompete drafting circles is whether to define the prescribed “business” or refer to the “business being conducted by the Company,” or words to that effect. In a nutshell, those in favor of defining the business tend to believe that instructing the employee (and eventually the court) with specificity as to which lines of business are within the scope of the noncompete is preferable, whereas the folks choosing to refer to the “business being conducted by the Company” may be concerned that defining the business specifically may preclude application of a noncompete to new product lines that emerge following the execution of the noncompete.

Drafting decisions made on this issue can have far-ranging effects, causing the trier of fact to determine what a competing business is. Note the case of Luminar Laval Ignite Limited v. Mama Group PLC and Mean Fiddler Holdings Limited, in the First Division, Inner House, Court of Session in Edinburgh, Scotland (http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2010CSIH01.html), which involves a noncompete in which a music venue was sold by one group to another. The selling group operated a nearby music venue and, in the purchase and sale agreement, restricted the purchasing group from operating a music venue that engages in “late night entertainment in direct competition on a like for like basis with the discotheque business” of the selling group, although the purchasing group was specifically permitted to operate the purchase property “as live music venue, or a bar at which music is played.”

This “like for like basis” language, with respect to which one judge stated, “The phrase which the parties used seems to me to be a recipe for litigation,” had the effect of causing the judges to attempt to determine whether the noncompete was violated by the purchasing group’s operation of a discotheque that played recorded music that may have differed in style and ambiance from that of the selling group (including whether one club catered more to people who wanted “to get trashed”).

The lower court found that the purchasing group could operate its club without violating the noncompete because one club was “regarded as studently and trendy” while the other was “popular and good for dancing, but also ‘cheesy.’” The higher court disagreed, finding that the distinction between “cheesy” and “studently and trendy” was not appropriate and holding that the purchasing group would be violating the noncompete by operating a club playing recorded music in any style and with any ambiance.

So, in sum, whether you are drafting a noncompete in the businesses of medical devices, insurance, industrial equipment, operating a discotheque or club or any other field of business, you should consider whether you would like to specifically describe which lines of the applicable business are subject to the noncompete or let a judge make that determination for you. Who is in a better position to understand the intent of the parties with respect to, for instance, which types of music (or medical devices or insurance offerings) are considered competitive to your business?

Tried and True: Breach of the Duty of Loyalty – An Important Weapon in Fight Against Misappropriation and Unfair Competition by Former Employees

A great deal of discussion has taken place in the legal press recently about the use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as a cause of action against those who take with them information from their former employers for use in subsequent competitive activities.  And rightly so, given the explosion in the number of civil claims brought pursuant to the statute in recent months.  Much less discussion has been heard, however, about a long-recognized cause of action – breach of the duty of loyalty – that can be a crucial component of a well-thought-out attack against the misuse of confidential information by a former employee and his/her new employer.  The importance of this cause of action was highlighted in a recent decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, InfoCorp, LLC v. Hunt, Case No. 2007AP2887, 2009 WL 4800140 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2009).

InfoCorp, LLC (d/b/a “InfoCor”) is a reseller of so-called “SMART Boards,” interactive whiteboards that combine the functions of an overhead projector, computer projector and a chalkboard.  Hunt started work at InfoCor in 2005.  Before that, he worked for 2 InfoCor competitors selling the same product and had developed a particularly strong relationship with a customer (“CESA 2”) that, among other things had a cooperative purchasing program representing a number of Wisconsin school districts.  Hunt was employed by InfoCor for a year.  During that time, CESA 2 entered into an agreement with the manufacturer of the SMART Boards to purchase its products at reduced prices and InfoCor was the only reseller authorized by CESA 2 to provide those products to its member school districts.

In 2006, Hunt approached a sales manager at one of InfoCor’s competitors, and was ultimately hired.  During his last month at InfoCor, Hunt attempted to divert a number of customers to his soon-to-be new employer and helped arrange for the new employer to become another authorized reseller of SMART Boards to CESA 2.  A few months later, after Hunt’s employment with InfoCor had ended, CESA 2 terminated InfoCor’s status as an authorized reseller of SMART Boards.

InfoCor sued Hunt and his new employer alleging trade secret misappropriation, violation of Wisconsin’s computer crime statute, tortious interference, common law and statutory conspiracy claims, conversion and breach of the duty of loyalty.  The trial court dismissed all of InfoCor’s claims on a motion for summary judgment except its claim for tortious interference based on Hunt’s interference in InfoCor’s customer relationship with CESA 2 prior to terminating his employment at InfoCor.  InfoCor appealed the dismissal of its duty of loyalty, conspiracy and the portion of InfoCor’s tortious interference claim relating to Hunt’s post-termination activities.

The Court of Appeals reversed, with the bulk of its discussion focusing on the duty of loyalty claim.  While the decision is unpublished and, therefore, not binding (under a recent change in Wisconsin’s rules, however, it may be cited for its persuasive effect), its historical discussion of when a duty of loyalty exists is helpful and identifies the issues that generally arise in those cases.  The result highlights why the claim can be such an effective one for a company seeking to protect its information in the hands of a former employee and its competitors.

The Court’s analysis was primarily addressed to the question whether Hunt owed InfoCor a duty of loyalty in the first instance.  The trial court had held that Hunt did not owe any such duty because he was a mere employee and not a corporate officer or the “’policy-making’ equivalent” of an officer.  In the trial court’s view, it was clear under Wisconsin law that only officers or policy making employees owe a duty of loyalty and that a salesman, like Hunt, did not fit into either category.

The Court of Appeals rejected that conclusion.  Relying on a line of Wisconsin cases going back to the early 1960’s, the Court of Appeals held that the test was not the authority of the employee with respect to the business as a whole which determined whether a duty exists, but whether the actions at issue were “within the scope of the employee’s responsibilities” and “directly contrary to the employer’s interest.”  Put another way, “an employee who uses the power of his employment responsibilities to harm his employer breaches his duty of loyalty” but an employee who was not a corporate officer and who “merely explored the possibility of starting a competing business, but did no actual harm” to the employer does not.  The Court of Appeals referred to this analysis as determining whether the employee’s duties make him a “key employee” giving rise to a duty of loyalty in relation to the performance of those duties.

Thus, even a “mere” salesman, like Hunt, can owe a duty of loyalty to his employee not to use his position to further his own or another’s competitive interests at the expense of his current employer.  Hunt’s actions in helping his future employer become an authorized reseller of SMART Boards to his primary customer, in direct competition with and ultimately to replace InfoCor breached that duty.

The utility of a breach of loyalty claim in dealing with employees who have taken crucial information and “jumped ship” should not be underestimated.

For example, while businesses often place significant value on customer information, courts have been relatively hostile to misappropriation of trade secret claims based on the use of such information.  A duty of loyalty claim, however, does not turn on whether the information or activities at issue involve trade secrets.

Similarly, the claim does not depend on the often-difficult task of justifying the precise terms of a contractual non-compete, particularly in states, like Wisconsin, where an overbroad employee non-compete is void in its entirety and cannot be enforced even to the extent reasonable.  Another advantage is that the claim sounds in tort as well as contract, opening up the possibility of punitive damages for particularly egregious conduct.

Another advantage of such a claim is that it focuses on the information at issue and the actions of the employee with respect to that information, i.e. it is easily tailored to the specific facts of the case.  It does not require the sometimes contortionist tactics needed to shoehorn the facts into a specific statutory cause of action like the CFAA or its state equivalents, which can be particularly problematic when the law under those statutes is changing quickly as the limits of the statutes are being tested and developed in a number of cases.

Finally, in those cases where the employee’s activities, like Hunt’s in the InfoCorp case, cause damage to the employer during his/her employment, the employer can also seek to recover the compensation paid to the employee during the period of the breach, including the value of benefits paid.  Combined with a conspiracy claim against the new employer where appropriate, the addition of a claim for punitive damages and return of employment compensation amounts can add significant dollars to the amounts at issue and, in general, increase leverage in negotiations to get back or prevent the use of the information.

The Massachusetts Noncompete Debate… Continuing Coverage

Georgia Supreme Court Limits Noncompete Injunction

The Georgia Supreme Court recently narrowed the scope of a noncompete injunction prohibiting a former employee of a retina surgery practice from marketing certain software in competition with his ex-employer.  Coleman et al. v. Retina Consultants PC et al. (GA S. Ct.).

Prior to his employment by The Retina Eye Center (“TREC”), Coleman — a software engineer — wrote and marketed a medical billing program called Clinex. While at TREC, he tailored the program to suit that company’s business and developed a separate retinal practice application, Clinex-RE.  As the lower court found, it is undisputed that Coleman incorporated TREC’s proprietary information and trade secrets in developing Clinex-RE, and that Clinex-RE only operates in conjunction with Clinex. The parties allocated the rights to Clinex and Clinex-RE in a software agreement that also restricted Coleman’s ability to distribute the Clinex software or any applications competitive with Clinex-RE to ophthalmologists or optometrists without TREC’s consent.

Following his resignation from TREC, Coleman attempted to distribute or license the Clinex and Clinex-RE software to other ophthalmologists; he refused to disclose to TREC necessary passwords to read and revise copies of the software; and  he used or attempted to use TREC’s proprietary information and trade secrets to compete with a company owned by Coleman and TREC that was formed to market Clinex and Cline-RE.

TREC brought suit for breach of contract and moved for an injunction to enforce the software agreement’s noncompete provision, and to enjoin Coleman from retaining and using access codes, source codes, other information, and passwords required to read and revise copies of Clinex and Clinex-RE.

Finding the lower court improperly enforced the noncompete clause at issue as it is unenforceable as a matter of law because of the failure to specify a time limitation, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the former employee could be prohibited from marketing Clinex and Clinex-RE together because — as the trial court determined — Clinex-RE includes proprietary information and trade secrets.  Coleman would not, however, be restricted from using and marketing his own version of Clinex as that software is his own property.

Further, the Supreme Court ruled that the injunction preventing Coleman from retaining any and all information and documentation related to Clinex was too broad and went beyond the scope required by the software agreement as it would foreclose him from access to information related to his own software to which he is entitled.

Spring Design, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com LLC

Hot off the presses. Spring Design, Inc. has filed an action against Barnesandnoble.com LLC, in the Northern District of California, alleging that Barnes and Noble breached a non-disclosure Agreement with Spring Design and misappropriated trade secrets related to Barnes & Noble’s development of an electronic book reader device. Click here for a copy of the Complaint that was filed on Nov. 2, 2009: Spring Design, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com LLC Complaint.

Update on the Massachusetts Noncompete Hearings

Yesterday, October 7, the Massachusetts legislature’s Joint Committee on Labor and Workforce Development took testimony on the two pending bills to reform Massachusetts noncompete law: one to ban noncompetes (House Bill 1794) and the other (House Bill 1799) to codify, clarify, and improve the existing complicated and unpredictable common law in this area.

The testimony began with the two state representatives, Lori Ehrlich and Will Brownsberger, who had each sponsored one of the two bills (Rep Ehrlich sponsored H.1799 and Rep. Brownsberger sponsored H.1794).  They explained that while, technically, the original two bills were up for consideration, they had been working together on a new “compromise” bill, which they are now sponsoring together.   The representatives then explained the need for and goals of the new bill and laid the groundwork for the ensuing testimony.

I spoke next.  After providing background of my qualifications for the role I played in connection with the bill (i.e., I was the lead drafter and advisor), I explained the current law and its problems; summarized key provisions of the new bill and how the bill addresses many of the problems with the current law; and explained how the bill sought to balance the interests of the employers against the needs of the employees.  In an effort to explain why the bill addresses certain issues and not others, I reminded the committee that the bill takes on almost 200 years of Massachusetts noncompete jurisprudence – which is no easy task.  To do more would have added substantially to an already lengthy bill, which as written codifies, clarifies, and modernizes current law; addresses the most pressing open issues in the current law; and provides much needed predictability for employers and employees alike.

Rob Mantell, who represents only employees (not employers), spoke next, and focused on the original bill to prohibit noncompetes (H.1794), although he also expressed support for the compromise bill.  Most of the rest of the testimony focused primarily on the witness’s position for or against the use of noncompetes.  In addition, many of the “usual suspects” were there, including Professor Matt Marx, who provided information about how noncompetes are used in practice, and Bijan Sabet, who spoke eloquently from the perspective of venture capitalists opposed to the use of noncompetes.

From a personal perspective, as I listened to the testimony, what came through was that reform was well overdue and that the balance achieved by the bill was correct.

An Illinois Appellate Court Rejects “Legitimate Interest” Test Followed for More than 30 Years in Illinois

Settled Illinois law regarding the requirements for an enforceable post-employment non-competition agreement were discarded by a September 23 opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court (4th District) which would make any non-compete enforceable so long as its duration and scope are reasonable even in the absence of a long-standing customer relationship or access to confidential information.

In Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Ehlers, No. 4-09-0290 (4th Dist.), the Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court (one of five appellate courts in Illinois) rejected decades of state-wide appellate court precedent applying the so-called “Legitimate Interest Test,”  by holding that an employer need not establish a legitimate interest (either long-standing customer relationship or confidential information) to enforce a post-employment non-compete.

The opinion recognizes that all five appellate districts had employed this test for years, citing a 1975 appellate opinion as the genesis of the rule. But the decision concludes that the Illinois Supreme Court had never endorsed the requirement in the few  non-compete cases — mostly involving professional practices — that the Supreme Court has decided in its history.

Sunbelt Rentals  recognized that it changes existing law, but proclaimed  that the appellant court has the power to change the rule for its district  and that is had no obligation to follow the precedent of other co-equal Illinois appellate courts.  Sunbelt concluded that only reasonable duration and territory are required to make a non-compete covenant enforceable in Illinois.

Sunbelt Rentals represents a sea change in Illinois non-compete law in the Fourth District (encompassing central Illinois including Springfield) and a stark conflict with the other districts  in Illinois, all of which have insisted on an employer establishing a legitimate interest as an element in a suit to enforce a post-employment non-competition restriction. 

Under the Sunbelt Rentals standard, non-competes could be enforced against clerical workers, retail store cashiers or construction workers if the duration and territory of the non-compete were reasonable as the employer would be relieved of establishing any business justification for the restriction.

While the other appellate courts  in Illinois are unlikely to abandon more than 30 years of precedent based upon the u-turn of the Fourth District ,  the law in Illinois regarding the required elements of a non-compete will be in turmoil until the Illinois Supreme Court steps in to settle the issue.